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THE NEED FOR AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY TO
MANAGE GLOBAL CHEMICALS AGREEMENTS
by Kelly Rain*

P

INTRODUCTION

rotecting human health and the environment from pollution by chemicals and hazardous materials has become a
global concern. Over thirteen key international chemicals/waste agreements and initiatives exist.1 The United Nations
Environment Programme (“UNEP”) supports a majority of
these agreements, but some are under the auspices of other UN
bodies or governments, such as the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization and the UN Commission for Europe.2 As the need
for chemicals regulation increases, managing the intricacies of
these multilateral chemicals/waste agreements (“MC/WAs”) to
take advantage of their linkages and coordinate implementation
continues to grow more complex.
This article explores the need for an independent governing
structure for all MC/WAs. Inevitably, chemical agreements and
initiatives inter-relate, and
should not be completely separated. For example, there are
common themes in many of the
chemicals agreements such as
dealing with import/export controls and developing strategies
for waste management. The
global chemicals community
should consider the possibility
of creating an independent entity to increase the effectiveness
and promote the synergies of existing MC/WAs.
The goal of this article is to promote discussion on whether
creating an independent governing structure will help harmonize existing and future MC/WAs, or just add bureaucracy to
the institutions.

include the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,7 the Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade,8 and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants.9 Together these conventions cover elements of “cradle-to-grave,” or more optimistically, “cradle-to-cradle.” In
other words, combined these three conventions regulate new
chemicals, existing chemicals, the import/export of chemicals,
waste management, and environmental releases. Therefore,
under these conventions chemicals are regulated through production, use, and disposal. Clustering them may thus facilitate a
life-cycle approach to chemicals management.10
Clustering will likely increase the comprehensiveness and
cooperation of similar MC/WAs. However, cooperation within
clusters may be hindered by different stages of implementation,
variances in development, and
dissimilar memberships.11 For
example, different priorities
exist during each stage of
implementation, which may
lead a convention’s parties to
decide cooperation is not in the
convention’s best interest.12
Likewise, some conventions are
more mature than others, resulting in a variance in their development needs. While clustering
serves an important purpose in improving the chemicals/waste
regime, an independent governing entity may allow better coordination for non-cluster concerns and crosscutting issues.

Chemical agreements and
initiatives inter-relate, and
should not be completely
separated.

IS “CLUSTERING” ENOUGH?

The need for integrating MC/WAs is apparent through
UNEP’s current efforts to explore clustering multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) with similar focus areas.3
Clustering tries to enhance synergies and linkages between
MEAs by increasing collaboration among their secretariats in
areas where common issues arise and the agreements have comparable areas of focus.4 Clustering considerations take into
account the need to promote capacity building, science and technology, reporting and monitoring, and more.5
The UNEP Open-ended Intergovernmental Group on
International Environmental Governance has debated the concept of clustering certain MC/WAs since its creation in February
2001.6 The three conventions widely considered for clustering
17

THE FAILURE OF SAICM TO FULFILL THIS GOAL

The Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (“SAICM”) is one example of an attempt by UNEP,
governments, and multi-sectoral stakeholders to increase coordination among MC/WAs. In February 2002, the UNEP Governing
Council adopted a decision that there was a need to further develop SAICM.13 In September 2002, the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg called for the completion of SAICM by 2005.14 The aim of SAICM is to achieve, by
2020, the production and use of chemicals in ways that leads to
the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health
and the environment.15 The International Conference on
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Chemicals Management (“ICCM”) adopted SAICM in Dubai,
United Arab Emirates, from February 4-6, 2006.16
The original aim of SAICM, a voluntary agreement, was to
provide a basic blueprint for the global management of chemicals. This included covering risk assessments of chemicals, harmonizing labeling, tackling obsolete and stockpiled products,
and helping the developing world safely manage chemicals.17
However, many participants at the ICCM felt that SAICM fell
short of these goals, especially regarding perception of the global plan of action.18 It is widely agreed that the tools for implementation of the SAICM are a key to its success. From the point
of view of most developing countries, the main tool of implementation is money; however, at the ICCM new and additional
funds did not come forth, with the exception of the “Quick
Start” fund to provide seed money to start programs in the
developing world.19
It is questionable whether meaningful chemical safety will
be able to result from the implementation of SAICM. The main
issue is whether another MEA will be able to promote the synergies of existing agreements. Each multilateral agreement comes
with bureaucracy and its own internal mechanisms. As such,
SAICM may just exacerbate the
issue of lack of harmonization
among MC/WAs by adding
another secretariat to the existing group. An umbrella organization, without its own mission
and agenda, would be better
equipped to increase coordination amongst MEAs. The key
feature of an independent entity
is that it would not have any
personal incentives; the impetus
for its existence should be to
promote coordination in the
global chemicals/waste community.
The probability that SAICM will be able to reform international chemicals management appears unlikely; thus, there
remains a strong need for an independent governing structure
for all MC/WAs.

erate with other MEAs.21 Such fragmentation places stress on
States considering ratification because of their limited ability to
handle the responsibility of complying with each MEA.
Inadequate compliance and enforcement have also plagued
the MC/WAs. While the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer22 developed one of the first compliance
regimes in the 1980s that focused on assisting parties in non-compliance, many of these regimes have only recently been formed.23
For example, the Basel Convention Implementation Committee
was adopted after three years of negotiations in 2002.24 Moreover,
numerous MEAs lack or have weak verification procedures.25
Additionally, a successful compliance committee needs to be able
to evolve based on experiences of the convention and must be
adequately monitored.26 The current structure of MC/WAs has
mainly failed to provide sufficient compliance and supervising
structures. A lack of compliance systems within MC/WAs makes
these agreements defective – what is the point of an agreement if
there are no provisions for enforcement?
Established in 1972, UNEP acts as the coordinator of environmental action and management within the United Nations.27
While UNEP lacks formal powers, it is suppose to be the nucleus of the international environmental regime.28 However,
UNEP has not been given, or has
not used, the complete authority
necessary to fulfill its task as a
catalyst for MEAs.29 Limited
membership in the governing
council and lack of resources are
other factors that hinder the
authority of UNEP.30
MC/WAs utilize different
financial mechanisms, some of
which struggle with inadequate
funding. Insufficient funds may
hamper the implementation of agreements and prevent the
development of synergies and cooperation among conventions.31 A recent study by the Rotterdam Convention found that
MEAs experience serious financial hardship when they rely
solely on “(1) voluntary contributions for their financial mechanism, or (2) coordinating mechanisms instead of true financing
mechanisms.”32 For example, the Montreal Protocol’s “stand
alone” financial mechanism has been attributed with this MEA’s
success.33 Conversely, the voluntary mechanism of the Basel
Convention has lead to a non-dependable stream of discretionary financial resources for the Convention.34

UNEP has not been given,
or has not used, the
complete authority
necessary to fulfill its task
as a catalyst for MEAs.

CURRENT SHORTCOMINGS

Evaluation of some of the current shortcomings in the
MC/WAs regime helps distinguish necessary steps to increase
effectiveness; however, this discussion is far from conclusive.
Still, motivation can be drawn from this limited critique towards
creating a more effective organizational structure of all MC/WAs.
Current fragmentation between the various MC/WAs has
led to numerous inefficiencies. For example, these agreements
are not under the auspice of one governing body, and the secretariats of these Conventions are located throughout the globe.20
This fragmentation, coupled with the increase in MC/WAs, has
led to a diversified body of rules for each MEA. Likewise, a
degree of “sovereignty” exists that some conventions are
unwilling to give away, resulting in their disinclination to coopSPRING 2006

AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNING ENTITY SHOULD BE
JUDGED ON HOW IT RESOLVES THESE ISSUES

The creation of an independent governing entity for the
expanding number of MC/WAs would likely help harmonize the
conventions and increase effectiveness. The threshold question
is whether the creation of such a body would alleviate some of
the complications that currently plague the MC/WAs, or just
create another administrative burden.
18

All chemicals/waste agreements would be altered to exist
under the auspice of this independent entity, which would be
under the United Nations umbrella. Each MEA would retain its
secretariat and most of its other internal machinery. The chemicals/waste governing entity would have advising power, but no
executive authority. Some of the functions of this organization
would be to monitor compliance, encourage coordination, assist
with dissemination of information, provide recommendations to
individual MEAs, and serve as a resource of information. A
major alteration would be the creation of a financing mechanism
under this entity for all MC/WAs.

POSSIBLE STRENGTHS OF AN INDEPENDENT
GOVERNING ENTITY

Numerous strengths can be identified for uniting all
MC/WAs under one roof. For example, when decision-making
is integrated, it reduces the risk of
repetition, inconsistencies, and conflict.35 A greater chance of collaboration and identifying gaps in the
research would also exist.
The pooling of scientific and
technical knowledge and the avoidance of duplication would be one of
the benefits of an independent governing entity. Increased dissemination of science and technology has
always been an attraction to clustering conventions that are directly
related.36 An independent umbrella
organization would allow the creation of a technical body that
would facilitate the pooling of information on health and environmental impacts of chemicals. This body would serve as a
library equipped with the information to help promote meaningful chemicals safety. Additionally, gaps in research would be
identified more quickly.
An independent governing structure would reduce fragmentation and increase communication between the conventions. Instead of having numerous UN bodies responsible for
implementing MC/WAs, they would all be under the auspice
of one entity. Thus, a degree of conformity would exist among
all the MC/WAs, even if the secretariats are still located in
different regions. Additionally, overarching committees for
compliance, information, and financing will inspire the MEAs
to work together to instill full authority into the governing
entity, giving them the foundation that UNEP has not been
able to provide.
Another strength would be the ability of the governing entity to try to establish an effective implementation and compliance
committee. While this will prove to be challenging, the governing
entity will be able to monitor the execution of each convention at
a national level, and search for non-compliance. Additionally,
there is a current need for a judicial instrument to help settle compliance disputes.37 The governing entity could provide this venue,
allowing a much needed arena for dispute resolution leading to
greater compliance within the chemicals regime.

An independent entity would also lead to a more stable
financing mechanism. Combining the financing mechanisms of
all MC/WAs would increase the success of these agreements.
The Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) provides an example
of a successful multipurpose operational entity. As the sole
financing facility that serves more than one convention, the GEF
provides insight into the possible establishment of a similar
financial structure for chemicals.38 The GEF also provides a
sound model of sustainability since its donors have provided
between $2 to $3 billion of financing for each of its first three
replenishment periods.39 The possibility of creating a separate
entity, similar to GEF, with a focal area to support all MC/WAs
has promise to help accelerate the progress of these agreements
by assuaging financial problems.
There is also the consideration of expanding the mandate of
GEF to include chemicals conventions that focus on more than
persistent organic pollutants, ozone
depletion, climate change, and international waters.40 In other words,
creating a “GEF Chemicals.” The
2005 study to find lasting financial
mechanisms for the Rotterdam
Convention identified the option of
“[e]xpanding the GEF focal area to
serve a cluster of chemicals conventions and processes, including the
Rotterdam Convention.”41 A study
of financial considerations for
implementation of the SAICM conducted in July 2005 also explored
the possibility of funding SAICM under the GEF.42

An independent
governing structure
would reduce
fragmentation and
increase
communication. . .
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POSSIBLE WEAKNESSES OF AN INDEPENDENT
GOVERNING ENTITY

The possibility exists that creating a governing entity
responsible for implementing all of the MC/WAs will not
improve the current troubles experience by the agreements but
will merely transfer them to a new entity.
While an independent governing body may be able to
decrease external fragmentation among MC/WAs, it does not
mean that the individual conventions will be willing to give up
their autonomous nature. Each MEA has its own structure consisting of the secretariat, a conference of the parties, advisory
bodies, technical experts, and more. An independent governing
body does not impact the organization of each individual agreement. Thus, the people responsible for running each MEA may
still be unwilling to cooperate even if there is an increase in
external coordination.
While it is undisputable that there is much overlap between
these agreements, it may be difficult to create effective machinery
that provides technical bodies and committees for MEAs with different members and focal areas. For example, differing research
needs of the convention may result in disputes of the allocation of
research funding by the scientific and technical knowledge technical body. The administrative backlog from trying to coordinate
the various chemicals/waste agreements may negate the purpose
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

of collaboration. Additionally, an MEA is not a stagnant agreement. Most MEAs evolve over time, with their needs and goals
altering. The task of trying to create an implementation and compliance committee that is able to
monitor and regulate all the
MC/WAs may prove extremely
difficult, if not impossible.
An important goal of many
MC/WAs is to assist developing countries in protecting
human health and the environment. It is possible that the balance of power may become
skewed within an administrative structure trying to coordinate all of these important
MEAs. In the end, developed
nations, industry, and better
funded organizations may end up with more control than is in
the best interest of the parties of the Conventions.
Moreover, the creation of an independent financial mechanism for MC/WAs might experience a similar imbalance of
power. The triumph of an MEA can be directly attributed to its
financial resources, and developing countries are in dire need of

money in order to have the tools to implement the sound management of chemicals. However, wealthy developed countries
that contribute more financial resources tend to have a louder
voice on the allocation of funds
than developing countries. Pooling the resources of the MEAs
into either a “GEF Chemicals” or
an independent financial mechanism leads to issues of having to
deal with a large amount of
bureaucracy to accomplish the
fair distribution of funds.

[P]eople responsible for
running each MEA may
still be unwilling to
cooperation even if there
is an increase in external
coordination.

CONCLUSION

The creation of an independent structure to govern all
MC/WAs would allow the greatest chance for successful international chemicals management. It
can be debated whether creating this governing body to house
all MC/WAs will help coordinate existing and future agreements, or just add another layer of complications. However, the
global environmental community is running out of alternative
options to help harmonize sound chemicals management.
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